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A LEGAL GOSPEL FOR AN INDUSTRIAL AGE*
BY ANAN RAYMOND**

For want of a better phrase for the peculiarities of our time,
we call it an Industrial Age. Whether in its objective phenomena it is or is not unique in the world's history, it is certainly
unique in the history of the human mind. No other age has had
the self-consciousness of this one. No other has been so introspective. No other has had the modern passion for analysis, for
definition and for nomenclature.
No other period in the world's history has so thoroughly examined itself, recognized its own outstanding traits, and put a
label on them. Greek or Roman may have sensed the rounded
perfection and self contained harmony of his civilization, but his
own historians and philosophers never realized that it was to go
down in history as the classical age. That label was affixed by
their successors and inheritors, and there was in the name nothing of classical antiquity's own reaction to itself. Medieval man
did not himself classify and label as feudalism the regimented
personal relationships under and by which he lived. The combined agricultural and mercantile economy of the Renaissance
and of early modern time developed, its participants unwitting,
until Adam Smith made mercantile society self-conscious.
Perhaps it is because the transformation of an agricultural
and mercantile society into an almost completely industrialized
one has been so rapid, that our age is so conscious of itself. In
a recent and significant book, "Business Adrift," Wallace Brett
Denham and Alfred Whitehead point out that many of our modern economic and social necessities arise primarily out of the
acceleration of the cycle of change. Before the industrialization
of Western civilization, this cycle was more than an ordinary
generation, so that the rising generation has had at least some
experience of the conditions under which their fathers lived and
worked. Since the development of industrialism and during the
last half century particularly, the process has been speeded up
to the point where major changes may and do take place within
the period of economic activity of a single lifetime-that is to
say, within the span of an ordinary business career, we moderns,
* An address delivered before the Indiana State Bar Association at
Lafayette, Indiana, July 9, 1931.
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so to speak, see such cycles begin, develop and culminate before
our very eyes. No one who has witnessed the major developments of the last thirty years needs any proof that there is more
than a little truth in this suggestion.
It would be shortsighted not to give some deliberate thought
to our profession's function and status in this day of rapidly
shifting values. In what gospel should we believe, in order to
be of highest usefulness in such an era? To answer the question, it would seem that we should first look at the actualities of
human conduct, and then determine whether our legal ideas are
in harmony with the changes, if any, manifested by human action itself. In what respect has human living so changed, as to
give our time its supposedly unique characteristics.
Without reference to the libraries which have been written on
the subject, a few of these mutations immediately occur to all of
us. Whereas life once centered about the farm and village, it
now has its focus in the factory, the steel mill, and the power
plant. Our customs, our manner and our morals, once predominantly agricultural, have become urban. The balance of population has definitely shifted to our cities which, more and more,
are the repositories of political and economic power. The once
controlling influence of the countryside is now an abortive veto.
The most militant agrarianism is couched in industrial terms.
The farmer thinks and speaks in the terms of the city. Once
land for farm settlers was the objetcive of American imperialism. Now, sources of raw materials, trade routes, and outlets of
new capital investment are the primary concern of our statesmanship.
Mass production, once an economic theory, has become an
economic necessity, and the standard of American industrial
practice. Labor, once merely one of the costs of production, has
become the chief factor in consumption; and capacity to consume
rather than capacity to produce, is the present day measure of
economic well-being. Workers no longer own the tools of their
own production; by means of that masterpiece of legal metaphysics, the corporation, typical ownership is now indirect. To
mobilize these tools great aggregations of capital are necessary.
To use them effectively workers must be marshalled in armies,
to be dealt with in the mass rather than as individuals. As a
response to the necessities of such an economic system, a social
organization based largely on occupation has supplanted the individualistic social structure of a few generations ago. This
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new relational society has behind its social compulsions as much
force as medieval feudalism ever had.
Of this type of economic organization, our country is the prototype. Business cycles and industrial depressions have not
altered our conviction that here there has been a better diffusion
of its advantages, and less individual suffering and social damage by reason of its flaws than anywhere else. That such a system is capable of producing and does produce large material
benefits, is hardly to be denied. These benefits, it is true, are
not always distributed as well as they might be. None the less,
for our people industrialism has meant large money earnings,
cheap and plentiful goods, cheap and plentiful means of transportation and communication, cheap and plentiful amusement
and recreation, and a general concern for such social aims as
education and health.
Making due allowance for shortage in times of stress, any
given American generation during its period of activity has had
far more of life's material reward than any similar group of
Europeans or Asiatics. The American not only has realized
directly more of the fruits of his own efforts, he has had handed
back to him, in community assets, more of his surplus production than his European or Asiatic competitor. While opinions
may differ as to the use we are making of some of these community assets, they are none the less there and available for
whatever better use we may some day learn to make of them.
Americans and Europeans have assumed that the rest of the
world would ultimately, almost as a matter of course, adopt this
form of economic organization, with its corresponding social and
political machinery. But there is now a tendency, more general
than it was two years ago, to search for the flaws in the system,
and to decry its benefits. In our country this search is still haphazard. In certain others it has become systematically hostile.
It proceeds on two different premises. One confesses and avoids;
the other denies. One says that, granting the industrial system
to be capable of producing consumable goods faster, cheaper and
better than any other thus far devised, it is by way of breaking
down because the scheme of ownership and distribution is so
defective as to keep these goods out of the hands of peoples who
ought to consume them; in short, that such a scheme permits the
many to be exploited for the benefit of the few. The other denies
industrialism any merit whatever, and asserts that it concentrates the energies of mankind solely upon the pursuit of ma-
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terial well-being, with a stultifying standardization of thought
and ideas, and a wholesale denial of man's higher aspirations.
The result is that the world offers the Western system of
capitalism and industrialism two rivals and competitors-one
already dangerous, the other capable of becoming so. The latter
is based on a view of human life so contrary to our own restless
energetic one, that we have not yet begun to think of it as a
threat to our way of doing things. None the less Ghandi's proposal that mankind abandon the factory, refuse to buy its
products, and return to its ancient and simple village life, has
captured the imagination of millions in the Orient. If it were
to spread, it would confine Western civilization to its own native
limits and make of it a mere local success. Our other rival is
thus far very much a going concern, and controls one-sixth of the
world's land area, with untold and unlimited natural resources.
It adopts the major promise of industrialism in toto, but just
as absolutely denies the minor one. It attempts to industrialize
an agricultural people over night. In doing so, it recognizes
only the state as entrepreneur, employer, and collector and disburser of dividends-if any.
No endorsement of either localism or communism, of either
state socialism or state capitalism, or of any of the halfway
measures various governments have adopted to forestall any
of them, is implied in recognizing that we can beat our competitors only by outselling them. This is another way of saying that
to survive, industrialism must continue to give those who live
by and under it more than its competitors can or do. As far as
our people are concerned, they have as little taste for revolution
as for non-resistance. Our present economic organization is
here to stay, until by the natural processes of economic evolution something better supplants it. Our people are committed
to it. They expect to work out their economc destiny under it.
They refuse and for a long time will continue to refuse to
acknowledge that American courage, inventiveness and enterprise are not equal to the task of making it work. So long as
we continue to use it, we must all share the responsibility; we
shall make a great mistake if we assume that human nature has
changed merely because people earn their livelihoods in new
ways.
More heavily than upon any other single profession or class,
that responsibility rests upon the lawyers of America. The concept of public service, which has done so much to put every call-
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ing upon a higher plane of action, is to the lawyer an age-old
tradition. Though he is in some respects the servant rather than
the author of social and economic development, that development
cannot, without his aid, take place in an orderly or logical way.
Few lawyers are capitalists-or even kulaks. Few have the
capitalist's and industrialist's direct responsibility to investors,
to employes, and to consumers, to say nothing of their necessary
pre-occupation with industrial problems requiring immediate
solution. Of the professions in any way qualified to deal with
the subject matter, the lawyer, like the economist and the engineer, is free to render a disinterested service. The lawyer alone
by training, tradition and function, is in a position to recognize
the dividing line and to maintain the necessary balance between
collective needs and individual rights.
What should be his gospel, in order to be of maximum service
in preserving the recognized good and correcting the recognized
evils of a society organized primarily on an industrial basis?
Obviously, the first thing he must do is to put his own house in
order. He must first of all make sure that current legal problems are solved promptly, without obstruction, and with such
clarity that no man shall be in doubt as to his rights and duties
under the existing organization of society. No hypothetical future benefit can compensate the individual, or society, for the
law's present delay, for its failure to vindicate a present right
or punish a present wrong.
This does not mean that the administration of justice in
America has broken down. Nor are the weaknesses in its ad4
ministration entirely the fault of lawyers and judges. Like most
other human instrumentalities, it works as well as society's
immediate and absolute needs require. The administration of
justice becomes "nasty, brutish and short," when taken from the
hands of those trained to administer it. And that is some indication of the risks inherent in the growth of any general conviction that lawyers and courts do not adequately serve the needs of
society. We shall gain in the long run, however, by admitting
that, so rapid has been our industrial development, our system
of jurisprudence has not, in either substance or form, kept full
pace with it.
We are still victims of the assumption that when we have
defined the legal relationships between individuals, we have gone
far enough, no matter what may be the social implications of
their conduct. We still assume that a system of personal rights
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and corresponding individual remedies, is a sufficient foundation
for our social and economic superstructure. We are still too
prone to assume that processes and procedure devised to meet
the needs of a purely individualistic state of society, and of a
slowly evolving economic organism, are adequate to those of a
very different economic system developing at a greatly accelerated rate of speed. We still assume that economic development
must conform to its legalistic conception. The business and
industrial community instinctively feels that the direct converse
should be true.
The American Law Institute and the judicial councils of many
states are, of course, making constructive efforts in the direction
of the simplification of the law and the speeding up of legal
process. There are, however, still too many laymen who feel
that they are not getting value received for the public money
they spendon courts of justice and the private money they spend
for legal services. There are still too many of them who feel
that the path to definite legal results should be shorter, plainer
and freer from labyrinths in which the figure of justice may be
lost sight of. We as lawyers ultimately must choose between
ourselves, putting our legal machinery in better working condition, or having the layman take the job out of our hands.
History is not without examples of cases in which our profession
has been confronted with just this choice.
Our second gospel must be a corollary of the first. As an incident to clearing the decks for a cleaner cut and more expeditious
administration of justice, we must insist upon a higher standard
of individual workmanship in our own field. Wherever the secret
of industrial ills may lie, it is not in technical inefficiency. The
problem which industrial societies must solve is one of distribution, one of the action and reaction of group forces upon each
other, rather than one of technical performance. In fact, many
seem to believe that we have suddenly become over-efficient, and
are producing too many consumable goods-as if there could be
such a thing as over-production of any useful commodity in a
world wherein millions still do not have enough food to eat,
enough clothes to wear, enough shelter over their heads, or
enough tools and machines to take part in the productive process
on their own account.
The fact, of course, is that there has never been in the world's
history so high a standard of personal efficiency as that which
the modern industrialist has set for himself. However conserva-
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rive his political, his social or his economic view, he is in his
industrial operations the greatest of improvisers and pioneers.
No vested interest is too sacred to be scrapped in the interest
of better processes, better methods, better materials, better machinery, means of faster and cheaper production. His difficulty
is, not that he does not know how to produce efficiently, but that,
too often, he does not know what to do with his product after
he has turned it out. Nor, thus far, has he been able to devise
any effective way of returning to industry the man power which
his very efficiency disemploys. And this flaw in the industrial
process has almost reached the point where we can increase efficiency only by losing consumers. If in solving this and other
problems the legal profession is to give to industry the assistance to be expected from it, its own technical efficiency must
reach a standard as high as that of those it hopes to help.
The man who lives in that rarifed atmosphere of practical
results is entitled to insist that when he invokes the aid of our
profession, it shall be given to him in such form as to make
those results more workable rather than less so. He never will
be able to understand why legislatures composed largely of lawyers should continue to enact statutes for the government of a
country already burdened with far more laws than it can enforce. He never will be able to understand adherence to the
letter of constitution or statute, in violation of or damage to the
spirit. He never will approve, nor see good reason for, the law's
delay. He will continue to resent the obscuring of issues, in contract or pleadings, by unintelligible or archaic language. He
will continue to believe that to try an accounting case effectively
the advocate ought to know something about accounting; and
that to give effective legal advice on any phase of modern industrial operations, the counselor ought to know something about
industry.
This brings us to our third gospel, which is that in this rapidly
changing industrial world the lawyer, if he is to do more than
deal with the pathological end-products of industry, must understand the industrial process itself. To ask courts to treat anything except the facts of particular cases before then would, of
course, introduce endless confusion into our system of jurisprudence. Recognition of this cardinal principle, however, has
never relieved any court of responsibility for the ultimate social
and economic consequences of a precedent established in any
case. To the extent to which the advocate makes these ultimate
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consequences a part of the background of every litigation, so that
the court's decision may rest upon them as a part of the pertinent facts, he equips the court that much better to discharge this
responsibility. To the extent that, in advising his clients, the
counselor is able to see through surface factors to basic ones,
and put all elements in their proper relation to controlling social
and economic forces, he aids in that effective marshalling of
those forces upon which we must depend to prevent a breakdown
of our industrial fabric.
The industrial process is neither so simple nor so mysterious
as much popular opinion makes it. It is not, and if it ever Was,
then it is no longer, a simple matter of buying raw materials
and hiring labor as cheap, and then selling the product as dear,
as possible. Neither is it a matter of legerdemain or other
hocus-pocus whereby as if by magic two Ford cars are made to
flourish where but one feebly struggled for existence before.
Every industry, however small or however large, must respond
to the same laws. A single individual engaged in the simplest
form of agriculture on the smallest plot of land, must produce
enough to feed, clothe and shelter himself and, if he is going to
contribute anything to the country's "capital," must have something left in the form of a profit. Whether he turns that profit
into money is an incident to, and not an integral part of, the
industrial process. Every other industry, no matter how great,
must in the same way, first of all sustain itself and the peoples
who contribute their services to it. It must if possible produce
more, to be contributed in the form of profits to the nation's
store of surplus wealth-that is, its capital.
The whole process is as simple as all that. On the other hand,
it is as complicated as the little known laws of economics, the
almost unknown laws of sociology, the changing tastes of a people, the transformation of industry from a local to a world
activity, and varying degrees of efficiency, management, vision
and growth can make it. In short, the legal profession must
produce lawyers who know what industry is, and why; who
understand the laws of economics, or at least how they operate
in practice; and who, moreover, understand that the lawyer's
own service must be a productive one, and that the fee paid him
is just one more charge which industry itself must offset by
increased production, if it is to live up to the mathematical laws
which are its life and death.
Our fourth and our highest gospel must be nothing less than
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a realization of our ultimate professional duty to the industrial
society of which we are inescapably a part. Unfortunately, that
duty must be abstractly defined. But its concrete application
must be found in the relation of every lawyer to his client. The
collectivism which is a logical result of industrialism is not a
prospect but an actuality. Our salvation lies, not in the impossible feat of getting back to pure individualism, and certainly
not along the-for us at least-unthinkable road toward a complete merger of the individual consciousness in that society. We
shall have in spite of ourselves to keep the collectivism we have,
and work and live under it. Our problem, then, is to preserve
its benefits and eradicate its flaws; to retain the manifest good
of a co-operative state of society, and at the same time protect,
preserve and maintain the personal rights of the individualnot only his negative right to freedom from encroachment upon
his life, liberty and property, by governmental or by superior
economic force; but also that affirmative and inalienable right,
postulated in the Declaration of Independence, to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. Wealth, whether one's own or a
share of some other person's, is not essential to happiness. A
reasonable degree of economic security certainly is. Co-operative living, in a factory with ten thousand others, on a
co-operative farm, in a co-operative apartment, or as a unit in
any other co-operative machine, in itself hurts nobody. Men
will find it tolerable, however, only if they remain reasonably
free from social compulsion, have a reasonable choice of cooperative modes of life, and are not punished by curtailment of
social or economic opportunity for preferring one mode of
cooperation to another.
All societies are "capitalistic," in the sense that somehow and
by somebody surplus subsistence must be provided while industries become productive on their own account. As Americans,
we still believe that insofar as practicable the means and the
machinery of production should be left in the hands of individuals; and, more important, that the responsibility for initiating,
for obtaining reasonable efficiency, and for results, should be in
individual rather than in governmental or social hands. It
matters not that certain activities have been definitely assigned
to government as a representative of society as a whole; nor
that others have become so impressed with a public interest that
the individual's right to engage in and profit by them has been
curtailed. -The basic principle of dependence on and belief in
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individual initiative remains the same. As Americans, we still
feel and believe that adherence to that principle has accounted
in large measure for our efficiency, our success, and the comparative well-being of our people.
We have found to our sorrow, however, that the economic
destinies of a whole industrial civilization cannot with safety
be committed entirely to the spontaneous action or the inherent
wisdom of individual initiative. The one lesson of any value
which the last two years are now beginning to teach is that for
laissez-faire and the devil take the hindmost, we must substitute
conscious analysis and conscious planning. If in -making effective such plans, individual prerogatives must be curtailed or
abandoned, compensation will be found in the better distribution
of material benefits, and particularly in the higher degree of
economic security, which the exercise of proper foresight will
assure. There are no doubt many factors which operate from
century to century and are beyond conscious human control.
There is ample reason to believe that those which operate within
the normal industrial and business cycle can be brought under
governance, at least sufficiently to permit us to sail by chart
rather than blindly. The salvation of our industrial scheme depends upon such conscious planning. Insofar as these states are
concerned, our people will ask their government to exercise such
control for them, only after industry itself has failed to do so.
Our history fully justifies belief in our people's ability to chart
their own industrial course. They will expect the legal profession to show them how to do it. A dedication of the profession
to that duty should from henceforth be its highest professional
gospel. When the American people needed a political chart, they
turned instinctively to our profession. That chart has stood the
test of time and usage beyond all the expectations of its makers.
We must qualify ourselves for the similar call which industry
will shortly make upon us.
So to qualify ourselves, we must free ourselves from the
accumulated rubbish of outworn postulates. Just as the economic ideas of the laissez-faire school are still an obstacle to
effective industrial organization, so many of our individualistic
legal notions impede the development of a system of jurisprudence which in its basic concepts and in its flexibility of application will be an aid rather than a hindrance to the correction of
flaws in the industrial system. Legal concepts are not absolutes.
In the more fluid and more easily mobilized industrial society
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of the future, they must be recognized as what they are-tools
to work with. Let us acknowledge once and for all that they are
entirely relative and instrumental; and that the function of law
in a collective society is, not so much to vindicate absolute legal
rights, as to define relationships-between society and individual, and from group to group-in such wise that a full measure
of stability, security and economic well-being shall become the
common right and prerogative of mankind.
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